

## Enhanced ID Authentication Scheme Using FPGA-Based Ring Oscillator PUF



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1/26

### Contents





- Introduction
- Implementation of FPGA-based RO PUFs
- Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency
- IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme
- Conclusions

2/26

### Introduction



#### ➤ Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)





3/26

### Introduction



➤ FPGAs find sufficiently powerful for a majority of applications: flexibility, massive resources,...

➤ FPGA-based PUFs




4/26

## Introduction



### ➤ FPGA-based RO PUFs




Suh, G. E., & Devadas, S. (2007, June). Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation. In *Design Automation Conference, 2007. DAC'07. 44th ACM/IEEE* (pp. 9-14). IEEE.

## Introduction




### FPGA-based RO PUFs



Maiti, Abhronil, and Patrick Schaumont. "Improved ring oscillator PUF: An FPGA-friendly secure primitive." *Journal of cryptology* 24.2 (2011): 375-397.

Gao, Mingze, Khai Lai, and Gang Qu. "A highly flexible ring oscillator PUF." *Proceedings of the 51st Annual Design Automation Conference*. ACM, 2014.

## Implementation of FPGA-based RO PUFs




- Targeted for Xilinx Spartan 6 Series FPGA
- Delay element (inverter): One primitive LUT
- Basic RO:  $2^N$  inverters + a NAND gate, manually routed by FPGA editor → FPGA hard macro
- RO macros are precisely placed

7/26

## Implementation of FPGA-based RO PUFs



- 32 ROs × 16 inverter
- 5 ICs
- Evaluated by 1024 samples




8/26

Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



Statistic model of RO frequencies

$$f_{RO} = f_{nominal} + \Delta f_{proc,local} + \Delta f_{proc,global} + \Delta f_{OP}$$




9/26

Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



Impact of the Temporal Fluctuation

- Fluctuation ↔  $\Delta f_{OP}$  variation under a fixed operating condition (25°C, 1.0 V)
- Reliability factor  $(1 - \sigma/\mu)$



R. Maes, *Physically Unclonable Functions*. Springer, 2013.


R. Maes. "Physically unclonable functions: Constructions, properties and applications." Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium (2012). 10/26

Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



Impact of the Temporal Fluctuation

- 32 ROs × 5 ICs
- min  $\sigma/\mu = 0.0069\%$  (RO5/IC3)
- max  $\sigma/\mu = 0.0532\%$  (RO27/IC5)
- Reliability = 99.94% - 99.99%



→ The temporal fluctuation has little impacts on the ROs measured frequencies


11/26

Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



Impact of the Temperature

5 ICs × 32ROs × 256 samples (25°C, 40°C, 55°C, 70°C)




## Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



### Impact of the Temperature

- RO indices are sorted by  $f_{\text{mean\_IC3}}$  → keep the 3D surface smooth
- The dependence on temperature is quite strong, follows a predicted pattern
- Increase temp. → Decrease RO frequencies



25°C → 70°C → shifting the mean frequencies of ROs by 2.34-3.59 MHz


13/26

## Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



### Impact of the Temperature

- ROs frequencies do not necessary to be linear
- 40 → 55°C leads to decrease only 0.09-0.29 MHz



➤ *Absolute frequencies values are not suited for unique ID extraction*

N. Weste, and D. Harris, *CMOS VLSI Design: A Circuits and Systems Perspective (4th ed.)*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, USA, 2010

14/26


## Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



### Impacts of the Global And Local Process Variations

#### Global variation

- RO frequency vary significantly from die-to-die
- ROs at 25°C: Up to 5.61 MHz from IC1 to IC3
- Zig-zag shapes shift up/down from temp.-to-temp.



→ *Weak uniqueness*

15/26

## Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency




### Impacts of the Global And Local Process Variations

#### Local variation

- Cases of RO frequencies being close are quite common
- IC1 in 25°C:

RO indices	P
14-15	0.91
1-5	0.55
8-18	1
23-27	1
21-13	1



16/26


## Evaluation of the Designed ROs Frequency



### Impacts of the Global And Local Process Variations

#### Local variation

- Local differences are typically small (17 Hz to 65.27 kHz)
- *Pattern of local variation is very stable with respect to the temperature*



## IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme




### Conventional ID Extraction Scheme

$$ID = F(\{\Delta f_{ij}\})$$

$$\Delta f_{ij} = f_i - f_j \text{ - local variations}$$

- Neighbor pairwise:  $F \leftrightarrow$  sign function
- Strong correlation between the local variations/response bits



## IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme




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
- Neighbor pairwise:  $F \leftrightarrow$  sign function
- Strong correlation between the local variations/response bits



## IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme



### Proposed ID Extraction Scheme



S. Eiroa and I. Baturone, "Circuit authentication based on Ring-Oscillator PUFs," 2011 18th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits, and Systems, Beirut, 2011, pp. 691-694. 20/26

IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme



Proposed ID Extraction Scheme

➤ ID:  $R(\{\delta_i | i = 1, n-1\})$

$\delta_i = f_{i+1} - f_i$  k-bit value in 2's complement format

➤ Euclidean distance:  $d(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}_j) = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^{n-1} (\delta_{ik} - \delta_{jk})^2}$

➤ Normalized intra-distance:  $d_{intra} = \frac{d(\mathbf{R}_l, \mathbf{R})}{2^k \sqrt{n-1}}$

$\mathbf{R}_l$  - ID of  $l$ -th measurement

$\mathbf{R}$  - The nominal magnitude of the ID vector, calculated from large samples ID

21/26

IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme



Proposed ID Extraction Scheme

➤ Expect:  $d_{intra} \approx 0$

➤ Inter-distance:

$$d_{inter} = 1 - \sum_{i,j} \frac{2d(\mathbf{R}_i, \mathbf{R}_j)}{N(N-1)2^k \sqrt{n-1}}$$



22/26

IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme



The ID Stability

ID for IC1, 256 measurements



➤ IDs of IC1 retain mostly the same from sample to sample  
 max norm. distance:  $4 \times 10^{-3}$  max std. dev. of the norm. intra-distance:  $\sigma_{d_{intra}} = 4.233/26^4$

IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme




The ID Stability

➤ ID for 5 ICs at 25°C, 40°C, 55°C, and 70°C

➤ Threshold of the ID authentication process

$$d_{threshold} = 6\sigma_{d_{intra}}$$

$$d_{threshold} = 28.8 \times 10^{-3}, \sigma_{d_{intra}} = 4.8 \times 10^{-3}$$



## IC Identification Extraction and Authentication Scheme



### The ID Uniqueness

- Normalized distance between the IDs:

IC2	IC3	IC4	IC5	
$141 \times 10^{-3}$	$146.4 \times 10^{-3}$	$224.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$100.5 \times 10^{-3}$	IC1
	$154.4 \times 10^{-3}$	$249.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$140.2 \times 10^{-3}$	IC2
		$194.5 \times 10^{-3}$	$128.3 \times 10^{-3}$	IC3
			$181.2 \times 10^{-3}$	IC4

- Minimum distance is  $100.5 \times 10^{-3}$  (IC1 - IC5)

→ ~4.5/ ~3.5 times greater than the thresholds when the authentication is conducted at the same temperature/when there is no restriction in operating temperature

25/26

## Conclusions



- Systematically studied the impact of variations on RO PUFs
- Proposed an ID extraction and authentication scheme using FPGA-based RO PUF
- The experimental results show a very good level of reliability
- The circuit designs for both ROs array and ID extraction are kept simple and generic, thus, can be readily ported to other FPGAs with minimum modifications.

26/26

## Conclusions



Thank you for your attention

27/26